Israel recently dealt Iran two significant blows with two assassinations at the highest levels of Iranian proxies. First, the IDF took out Fuad Shukr, a senior commander of Hezbollah. The next day, Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the political bureau of Hamas, was assassinated in his guest house in Tehran. The assassinations join other tactical victories Israel has scored in its war against Hamas since the October 7 massacre. And yet, it’s at this point undeniable these have come at the expense of its larger strategic goals.
Indeed, beyond simply winning its war with Hamas, what are the larger strategic objectives of the State of Israel? Restoring deterrence? Destroying Iranian proxies? Regime change in Tehran? The reason we can’t say for certain is that the Israeli government has become fixated on the tactical aspect of this conflict, without developing a clear theory of strategic victory.
This also seems to be the conclusion drawn in a coordinated set of statements tweeted out Friday morning by the heads of Western states calling for deescalation, a hostage deal, and a pathway to a lasting peace. These are not things beyond Israel’s capacity. I know this because in the not-so-distant past, Israel faced the same challenge, and made a very different choice, to prioritize strategic victory.
On October 6th, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a joint surprise attack on two fronts against the State of Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, seeking to liberate their occupied territories—the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights respectively. After initial gains secured by both Arab armies, the IDF managed to tip the balance of battle with the help of the United States, which supplied the IDF with weapons and munitions to replace its losses during the opening days of the war.
On the Syrian front, the IDF managed to stop the advance of the Syrian army with better armor and artillery tactics, before succeeding in pushing back the entire attacking Syrian force and regaining control over the Golan Heights. On the Egyptian front, the United States Air Force deployed its most-advanced reconnaissance platform then, the SR-71 Blackbird, to collect a full intelligence picture of the battle-space, which was relayed to the IDF and provided the intelligence necessary for IDF troops to cross the Suez Canal.
As a result of these tactical victories, a ceasefire agreement was reached and observed. First and second de-conflictions were negotiated and carried out. Egyptian forces maintained their positions in the Sinai, and the IDF forces returned to their second line of defense. Ultimately, in 1979, a peace agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel, which has remained in place since.
Archive Photos/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
What the Yom Kippur War reflects is how military campaigns are most successful as part of a larger strategic vision. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat envisioned a limited military operation to break the status-quo as a first volley toward final-status negotiations, while the Israelis responded tactically to developments on both fronts to stabilize their defenses and regain control over territory. Eventually, Israeli leadership realized that peace was a strategic objective within reach in exchange for land. Both sides were tacitly following the advice of Carl von Clausewitz, who viewed war as “only a part of political engagement; therefore, by no means a thing in itself.” War “is nothing but a continuation of policy with a mixture of other means,” wrote Clausewitz.
This is the only method that has guaranteed lasting peace in the Middle East. Seen through this lens, Israel’s current campaign against Hamas is destined to fail, because it has turned war into an end in and of itself, rather than a means to the larger end of peace.
This is not to minimize Israel’s military and intelligence successes against Iran. These will be key to any future peaceful goals. The Islamic Republic of Iran helped fund, train, and supply Hamas, and also helped plan and execute the October 7 attack. Since the inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has inserted itself in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, using terrorism and proxy warfare as tools of statecraft, and offering itself as the only regional power that can “liberate Palestine”—when in fact this pretext was merely a construct to mask its own expansionist ambitions and vendetta against the Arab states for funding and supporting Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.
Majid Saeedi/Getty Images
And since October 7, Iran has ordered attacks on Israel and U.S. assets in the Middle East by Hezbollah, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), and the Houthis. All have engaged the IDF, and in some cases U.S. military personnel, in hostilities, launching anti-tank guided missiles, one-way attack drones, rockets, and missiles at different parts of the state of Israel. The IDF responded to those attacks, killing hundreds of Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, interdicting weapons shipments in Syria and Iraq, and assassinating IRGC commanders in Damascus.
What were Iran’s strategic goals? Simple: Iran hoped to thwart a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel by using the images of the ensuing death and suffering in Gaza to deny the Saudis public support on the Arab street. By thwarting the deal, Iran hoped to delay the Saudis from receiving advanced weapon platforms and nuclear technology from the U.S. Finally, Iran hoped to force the Biden administration to accept Iran as the gatekeeper and primary power broker in the Middle East, which would lead to the U.S. returning to the Iran Deal and lifting sanctions.
But while it’s clear what Iran’s larger strategic goals are, Israel’s are opaque, and without a broader vision, Israel cannot win.
What would a strategic victory in the Middle East look like today?
Denying the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies the cause they champion by delivering a two-state solution that ends the suffering of Palestinians and provides Israelis with the security they need and deserve. Because such a solution will be met with such joy on the Arab Street, it would give Arab leaders the political and popular mandate needed to normalize relations with the State of Israel and turn to face the real threat to regional peace, security, and stability by dismantling Iran’s terror and proxy networks.
The images of Sadat, Begin, and Carter shaking hands and celebrating the agreement of the Camp David Accords and the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel can be recreated again today—but only if the State of Israel announces its commitment to a two-state solution, and the Palestinian Authority announces its condemnation of terrorism and armed struggle as means to deliver statehood and national aspirations to the Palestinian people.
This end goal should be the aim of every one of Israel’s military endeavors against Hamas. Without this larger strategic goal, Israel’s military successes are pyrrhic.
M. A. Al-Asqalani is an independent national security and open source intelligence analyst based in Cairo, Egypt.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.
